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In this paper we evaluate the efficacy of Public Employment Services in 
Italy (PESs) in increasing the unemployment to employment transition 
probabilities, through matching techniques. Exploiting the longitudinal 
dimension of the LFS data we design an evaluation structure that 
allows observing outcomes in both the short (at most 3 months) and the 
long run (at most 12 and 15 months). In this framework, PES users 
show a lower probability of finding a job in the short term, because of a 
lock-in effect, while in the long term this probability turns out to be 
positive. Similar results are derived when considering as outcome a 
proxy for the quality of the job, i.e. having found a permanent job. 
Robustness checks and sensitivity analysis confirm this evidence, 
suggesting also that our estimates are to be considered as lower bound 
in the eventuality of unobserved negative selection into treatment. 
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1.   Introduction
∗ 
The last decade has seen lively debate arising over the role and the effectiveness of active 
labour market policies (ALMP), especially at the European level. Also the European 
Employment Strategy places great emphasis on the role of active labour market policies. 
For instance, the European Commission “calls for a strengthened emphasis on activation 
and prevention policies in order to limit the unemployment spell, and prevent inflow into 
long term unemployment, detachment from the labour market and inactivity”.1 In line 
with this institutional framework, most of the European countries have reformed their 
active labour market policies in order to accomplish the guidelines of the European 
Employment strategy. These reforms have hence generated a spread of evaluation 
exercises for most of European countries.2  
The main aim of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature concerning the Italian case, 
assessing the efficacy of Public Employment Services (PESs) after the reforms introduced 
in 1997, 2000 and 2003. Basically, these reforms pursued three main goals: a) improving, 
at the local level, the PES governance of the labour market; b) enhancing the 
employability of the unemployed that face greater difficulties in finding a job (unskilled, 
long term unemployed, women, etc.); c) providing services in order to increase the 
efficacy of matching processes between labour demand and supply. Subsequent to these 
reforms, PESs are required to provide job search assistance, counselling, training schemes 
and job proposals (intermediation) to their clients. It is also worth noting that in Italy 
passive labour market policies are not widely developed as in other European countries,3 
and they are not actually interacted with active labour market policies. For this reason, 
our analysis disregards issues related to unemployment benefits, since according to the 
labour force data (LFS) data they are negligible in the Italian labour market (less than 1% 
of the unemployed in our analysis). 
We use the LFS data for the period 2004-2006. Households selected in the LFS sample 
have to be interviewed four times during a 15 months period, according to a rotation 
scheme; merging data collected in the four interviews –at t1, t2, t3 and t4- we can observe 
transitions in the labour market (t2-t1 = 3 months; t3-t1 = 12 months; t4-t1 = 15 months).  
                                                 
∗ We thank Bart Cockx, Muriel Dejemeppe, Stefano Gagliarducci, Claudio Lucifora, Tommaso Nannicini, 
Enrico Rettore, Henri Sneessens, Barbara Sianesi, Henri Sneessens, and Bruno Van der Linden for their 
suggestions. We also thank Isfol for having funded this research project. The usual disclaimers apply. 
Moreover, the opinions expressed in this paper are ours and do not necessarily reflect those of our 
Institutions.  
1 European Commission (2004), p.26-27. 
2 Among others, see for instance Blundell et al. (2004) for UK, Crepon et al. (2005) for France, Gerfin and 
Lechner (2002) and Lalive et al. (2008) for Switzerland, Sianesi (2004) for Sweden, Weber and Hofer (2004) for 
Austria, Van den Berg et al. (2004) for the Netherlands, Lechner and Wunsch (2008) for Germany. 
3 According to OECD (2007), in 2004 the share of GDP referred to passive labour market policies are equal to 
0.65% for Italy, 1,71% for France, 2.67% for Denmark, 2.32% in Germany, 1.49% for Spain. Note also that in 
Italy there is not a welfare policy to better off the economic situation of individuals who do not have any 
source of income. This is another important difference with other OECD countries.   2
As far as the econometric technique is concerned, we use propensity score matching, 
as in other papers in the literature such as Blundell et al. (2004), Gerfin and Lechner 
(2002) and Sianesi (2004). As treatment variable we consider enrolment in the PESs. 
However, it would not be appropriate to define as treated those who declare to be 
enrolled in the PESs in the first of the LFS interviews, because in Italy enrolment in the 
PESs could have taken place a long time before the LFS interview: an unemployed might 
be enrolled in a PES for years and at the same time have no contacts with the PES in 
recent job searching.4 We claim that it is possible to define a more appropriate treatment 
variable exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the LFS. More specifically, we select all 
the unemployed that are not enrolled in a PES at t1. We then follow these individuals 
over time defining as treated those unemployed that get enrolled in a PES between t1 and 
t2. Further, we observe the outcome variables, i.e. being employed, both in a short term 
evaluation at t2 (after a period of time between one and nineties days from the actual 
treatment), and in a long term evaluation at t3 (after a period of time between 9 and 12 
months from the actual treatment) and t4 (after a period of time between 12 and 15 
months from the actual treatment). We hence evaluate whether the treated individuals 
display higher employment probabilities than the untreated, using propensity score 
matching.  
As in other papers (Sianesi, 2004), we show that it is crucial to compute evaluations in 
both the short and the long run. In particular, we point out that average treatment effects 
on the treated (ATT) are negative in the short run, while they become positive in the long 
run. We argue that in the short run the treated might be involved in a sort of lock-in 
effect, because they spend time in activities such us orientation periods, preparing CVs, 
training courses, etc. In the long run, when these activities are over, the treated display 
higher probabilities of finding jobs: after 12 (15) months around 8.3 (7.1) percentage 
points higher than the baseline probability for untreated of 29.7% (29.6%). Various 
robustness checks confirm these results, and a regional analysis underlines that our 
findings are more pronounced in the Centre-North region of the country.  
Another important dimension of the analysis concerns the quality of the match, as 
shown in recent related literature (Blundell et al., 2004, Crepon et al., 2005). In Italy, as in 
other countries characterized by segmented labour markets, permanent contracts can be 
considered as a reliable proxy for the willing of the employer and the employee to invest 
in that match over time. In an additional evaluation exercise we investigate whether a 
treated in a PES displays a higher probability of finding a permanent job with respect to 
the untreated. We use the same evaluation structure and treatment variable as in the 
previous analysis, while the new outcome variable is equal to one if an individual finds a 
                                                 
4 Note that this definition of the treatment variable was used in previous papers for Italy (Barbieri et al., 2002, 
2003), which investigated the efficacy of PESs in an intermediate step of the reform process, using data for the 
year 2000.   3
permanent job and to zero in all other cases. The results show that in the short term ATT 
are still negative (-3.4%), while they become not statistically different from zero at t3 and 
positive (3-4%) at t4. This means that the PES effects are less pronounced (lower in 
magnitude and not always significant) when considering permanent contracts as 
outcome variable, both in the short and in the long term.  
It is also worth underlying that since LFS data provide some evidence that PESs 
mainly supply services related to counselling and intermediation activities, our results 
are in line with other European evaluations that stress the efficacy of these kind of 
policies (Blundell et al., 2004, for the UK, Crepon et al., 2005, for France, Weber and 
Hofer, 2004, for Austria).  
The main potential critic to our evaluation exercise might be that since propensity 
score matching is based on selection on observables it is not possible to deal properly 
with selection on unobservables, which might entail a bias in the computation of our ATT 
estimates. However, we claim that propensity score matching is the best methodology we 
can use, for several reasons. First, because the LFS provides a particularly rich set of 
control variables – a necessary requirement in order to carry out the propensity score 
matching analysis, based on selection on observables. Second, because convincing 
instrumental variables are not available to deal with endogeneity issues of the treatment 
variable, as well as convincing thresholds for regression discontinuity designs. 
Nevertheless, we make use of the sensitivity procedure developed by Ichino et al. (2008) 
to assess the robustness of our ATT estimates to possible deviations from the original 
setting of the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), the main untestable 
assumption of matching procedures.  
Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis helps us to investigate further the issue of 
unobserved heterogeneity. Actually, it is usually argued (Barbieri et al. 2002, 2003) that in 
Italy a negative selection is at work in enrolment in PESs, i.e. high-ability and high-
educated workers resort to PESs less frequently than the low-skilled. The sensitivity 
analysis allows us to simulate confounders characterized by a negative selection effect 
and a positive outcome effect. When introducing such a confounder, ATT estimates are 
higher than the baseline figure. This means that if our set of covariates were not fully able 
to capture the unobserved heterogeneity, the ATT point estimates would range in a given 
interval of variation (8.3%, 10.8%), suggesting that our ATT estimates should be 
considered as lower bound of the ‘true’ PES impact.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the reforms concerning PESs 
over the last decade, and Section 3 provides a short explanation of the LFS data we use. 
Section 4 describes the PES evaluation structure, while identification issues are discussed 
in section 5. Section 6 presents the main results and robustness checks are reported in 
section 7. Section 8 focuses on the sensitivity analysis and Section 9 investigates further 
the issues of unobserved heterogeneity. Section 10 concludes.    4
2.   PES reforms in Italy in the last decade 
Over the last decade the intermediation role of active labour market policies has been an 
object of investigation in the economic and political debate, at both the European and the 
Italian level. The European Employment Strategy (EES), set up in the 1997 and updated 
several times in the last few years, stressed the importance of reform in public and 
private employment services in order to enhance employability in the labour market and 
reduce both the inefficiency associated with the mismatch between labour demand and 
supply and the social costs due to unemployment.  
As far as the Italian PESs are concerned, a number of legislative reforms have been 
introduced: in 1997 with the so-called ‘Pacchetto Treu’, then in 2002 with the 297/2002 
decree and finally in 2003 with a new decree (30/2003). Before these reforms, the PESs 
were managed at the national level by the central administration, taking care almost 
exclusively of the administrative certification of recruiting and of the listing of job offers 
and job seekers. In particular, the PESs had to record the information concerning the 
unemployment spells and the transitions towards employment. The efficacy of PESs in 
matching labour demand and supply was perceived as very low, the core of the PES 
activities being mostly administrative. 
The reforms introduced in 1997, 2002 and 2003, pursued three main goals: improving, 
at the local level, the PES governance of the labour market; enhancing the employability 
of the unemployed that face greater difficulties in finding a job (unskilled, long term 
unemployed, women, etc.); increasing the efficacy of matching between labour demand 
and supply.5 In particular, PES activities consist of a complex system of functions 
designed to reduce unemployment duration and improve the information flow between 
demand and supply in the labour market. These functions can be summarized with the 
following general tasks: a) collecting information on labour supply and labour demand in 
the local labour market; b) identifying priority target groups (long term unemployed, 
unskilled, women, disabled, immigrant citizens); c) providing individual services and 
placement programmes; d) supporting job search and participation in professional 
training courses, easing the access to the labour market; e) providing counselling to 
companies, information and support on existing specific incentives (collective dismissals 
policies, tax reductions, assistance on outplacements, etc.); f) promoting self-employment 
(job creation schemes). Furthermore, the reform process also established that the system 
of the PESs had to be decentralized to the regions (Regioni – NUTS2), in order to make 
them more effective in the local labour markets. The regions kept for themselves the 
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strategic planning of services, while the everyday running of the PESs was in turn 
decentralized to the provinces (Province– NUTS3).6  
The new PES setting in Italy establishes that the PESs have to offer their clients one of 
the following three alternatives:7  
-  a personal counselling interview within three months from the unemployment 
declaration,8 in which the staff of the PES illustrate to the unemployed the 
possibilities to find a job in that provinces (training courses, vacancies opened by 
firms, etc.);  
-  a short vocational training course and/or work practice, within 6 months from the 
unemployment declaration; this time period is reduced to 4 months in the case of 
young and of women out of the labour market for more than two years; 
-  a job proposal. 
An individual can, on a voluntary basis, decide to enrol in a PES. If enrolled, he has to 
accept the program established by the PESs.9 
In this framework, the goal of our analysis is to evaluate whether these PES 
programmes have an impact on the employment transitions for the unemployed. In 
particular, we are interested in evaluating the impact of PES treatment on the sample of 
unemployed aged 15-64 at t1.10  
It must also be stressed that, according to OECD (2007), a very high share of ALMP in 
Italy (about 60%) refers to incentives to create new jobs, such as the incentives provided 
for apprentiship contracts or for training on the job. As for the policies targeted to the 
assistance of the job-search process of the pool of unemployed, the PESs represent the 
most important active labour market policy in Italy. In particular, the LFS data show that 
of the 2,700,000 individuals looking for a job in 2004 (700,000 involved in on-the-job-
search), 28% (about 750,000) had contacts with PESs. A rough and conservative estimate 
of the total cost of PES is about 600,000 million euros (0.09% of GDP in 2004), partially 
financed by the European Social Fund.11  
As last important remark, we underline that in Italy active labour market policies 
(PESs) are not strictly related to passive labour market policies. In particular, eligibility 
                                                 
6 For this reason, there may be some geographical differences, due to the different forms of PES organization 
chosen by local authorities.  
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the LFS it is available only the reason of the last contact with a PES.  
8 Note that the unemployment declaration does not correspond to the beginning of the unemployment spell. 
It is instead related to the time in which the unemployed decide to resort to the PES.  
9 Actually, there are no pecuniary sanctions for unemployed enrolled to PES that refuse proposals from PES. 
However, in case of refusal they can be excluded from the program. 
10 We do not consider inactive people as well as the assistance provided by PES to the on-the-job search 
activities carried out by the employed.  
11 See Pirrone and Sestito (2006) for details concerning these estimates, and also for a juridical, economic and 
political description (and discussion) of the whole reform process.   6
for unemployment benefits is not affected by the monitoring concerning participations 
into active labour market policies. The interaction between active and passive policies is 
mostly formal, in the sense that individuals eligible for unemployment benefits have to 
get enrolled in a PES before starting receiving the benefits, mainly due to administrative 
reasons. It is also worth noting that the share of unemployed receiving unemployment 
benefits is very low, about 3% according to the LFS. The same share in the sample of 
unemployed that we use in the evaluation exercise in this paper is even lower, less than 
1%. We eliminate these observations from the analysis in order to avoid the possibility to 
detect some enrolled in a PES that are not actually looking for a job using PES, but are 
enrolled only to receive the unemployment benefit. 12 
 
3.   The Labour Force Survey data  
We use the LFS data provided by Istat. This survey was completely overhauled in 2004, 
from the old RTFL (Rilevazione Trimestrale Forze Lavoro) to the RCFL (Rilevazione 
Continua Forze Lavoro), according to the Eurostat guidelines. For our analysis two 
elements need mentioning in particular. First, the data quality has significantly 
improved, thanks to both the computer assisted technique utilized in collecting data and 
the new professional interviewers network. Second, the section relating to the PESs has 
been thoroughly revised, enhancing the set of the collected data (see Istat, 2006).  
As for the structure of the Italian LFS, the sample design follows a 2-2-2 household 
rotation scheme: households participate in the survey for two consecutive quarters, 
temporarily exit from the sample for the following two quarters, and then re-enter the 
sample for the last two quarters, after which they finally exit, as shown in figure 1. We 
use LFS data from the first quarter of 2004 – the official beginning of the new survey – to 
the third quarter of 2006, bringing together six consecutive household rotation groups. As 
already mentioned, we observe individuals at four interviews, at t1, t2, t3, t4 (as in figure 1, 
the rotation groups from A to F, from the first to the fourth interview). The second 
interview takes place three months after the first one, the third 12 months after the first 
one (9 months after the second one), and the fourth 15 months after the first one. We use 
the four interviews, instead of the two (t1 and t2) used by Barbieri et al. (2002, 2003), 
because in the first one we collect information on the control variables in a pre-treatment 
status, in the second we derive the treatment variable and the outcome for the short term 
evaluation, and in the third and the fourth interviews we observe the outcome for the 
long term evaluation (as explained in the following section). Consistently  to the 
propensity score matching theory, the covariates are observed in pre-treatment status, 
treatment then takes place, and finally the outcome is observed. This means that treated 
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and untreated are compared using pre-treatment variables, matching individuals that 
were the same before the treatment took place.13 
LFS also provides a very rich dataset, containing a wide range of control variables – a 
necessary requirement in order to carry out the propensity score matching analysis, 
based on selection on observables. We use the following information at t1:  
-  personal information: age, gender, education, education lag,14 search intensity 
(number of search actions undertaken to look for a job), previous job experience, 
potential experience, reasons related to the last job-separation if any (dismissal, 
retirement, temporary job), occupation in the last job if any, adaptability to accept a 
fixed term contracts, adaptability to accept part time contracts, adaptability to accept 
jobs involving geographical mobility, unemployment duration;  
-  household information: number of household members, number of members of the 
household enrolled in a PES excluding himself, number of members of the household 
employed;  
-  macroeconomic variables estimated using the LFS data at the provincial level (NUTS-
3): unemployment rate, employment variation (with respect to the previous 
interview, in percentage), turnover rate as a measure of labour market dynamics 
(computed between t1 and  t2), agriculture employment share, ISFOL index of PES 
endowments and structures,15 dummies for the related household rotation group.  
 
4.   Structure of the PES evaluation exercise and definition of treatment 
In this paper we use matching techniques. One of the main requirements to apply these 
techniques properly is to make treated and untreated individuals as comparable as 
possible. Computing the treatment variable appropriately is the major task to address in 
order to achieve this comparability. The easiest way would be to define as treated all the 
unemployed that declare to be enrolled in a PES in the first of the LFS interviews. This 
treatment variable definition, which has already been used in previous papers (Barbieri et 
al. 2002, 2003), cannot, we hold, be taken as a reliable treatment variable. This is because 
in Italy the enrolment in a PES is not closely related to the period of time in which the 
                                                 
13 Another methodological problem related to Barbieri et al. (2002, 2003) is the fact that control variables and 
treatment variables are observed in the same instant of time (at t1). We solved this problem exploiting four 
interviews of the LFS. 
14 Education lag measures the years of delay in achieving the related educational level for each individual. It 
is our contention that this variable captures, at least partially, an unobserved heterogeneity within levels of 
education (we do not have information about marks). In Italy there is a great variability in the number of 
years taken to complete degrees, especially for graduates and upper secondary school students. 
15 The ISFOL index refers to the year 2004. It is self-declared by each province administration, and consists of 
various components concerning the quality of PES infrastructure and services (computers, number of 
employees, range of services, quantity and quality of services, etc.). It can be considered as a proxy of PES 
endowments and structures, which might be taken into account by the unemployed in their decisions to 
enrol.    8
interview takes place: an unemployed can be enrolled in a PES for years and yet have had 
no contact with the PES for recent job search activities. In other words, an unemployed 
person enrolled in a PES that does not use PES services is not necessarily cancelled from 
the list. According to the LFS data, in 1999 in Italy there were 2.6 millions unemployed, 
while the enrolment lists of PES counted 7 millions individuals, making clear that many 
unemployed were not cancelled out from PES lists. 
For these reasons we design a different structure for our evaluation exercise. More 
specifically, we consider two pieces of informa t i o n .  F i r s t ,  w e  u s e ,  a s  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
papers, the information related to the enrolment in a PES.16 Second, we also exploit the 
information concerning the fact of having had contacts with PES in the last three months 
(between t1 and t2) in order to look for a job. Hence, our treatment variable is structured 
as follows. To begin with, we select in the first LFS interview all the unemployed not 
enrolled in a PES at t1.17 We then follow these individuals in the period of time between t1 
and t2, and we define as treated those that in the meantime have enrolled in a PES and 
have had a contact with a PES to look for a job. In our opinion this is a more appropriate 
way to focus on those unemployed who effectively used the PES to look for a job in a 
period of time close to the interview.  
As for the binary outcome variable (being employed, according to the Eurostat 
definition of employment), it is computed for the short term evaluation at t2 (after a 
period of time between one and nineties days from the actual treatment), and for the long 
term evaluation at t3 (after a period of time between 9 and 12 months from the actual 
treatment) and t4 ( a f t e r  a  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e  b e t w e e n  1 2  a n d  1 5  m o n t h s  f r o m  t h e  a c t u a l  
treatment).  
Figure 2 sums up the structure of our evaluation procedure. We select 2759 
unemployed “not enrolled” in a PES at t1. We then go on to observe those individuals 
who get treated between t1 and t2 (348 individuals). We observe the outcome variable at t2 
for a short term evaluation, and at t3 and t4 for a long term evaluation.18 Descriptive 
statistics and detailed explanations for the variables included in the set of covariates, by 
treatment status, are reported in Table A1 in appendix: treated and untreated display 
very similar observed characteristics. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the 
                                                 
16 Formally since 2002 PES registration does no longer exist, and it has been replaced by the formal 
declaration of unemployment status, which is usually still perceived by the unemployed as PES enrolment. 
These changes were taken into account in the LFS questionnaire in 2005. This means that in 2005 we consider 
as treated those who declare to have carried out the unemployment declaration.  
17 Note that we consider as untreated at t1 also the unemployed who declare to be enrolled in a PES and at the 
same time had the last contact with a PES more that 3 years ago. As already stressed, this situation can take 
place since in Italy it was possible to be enrolled in a PES without having any contact with a PES recently to 
look for a job. As robustness check, we considered as untreated at t1 also the unemployed who declare to be 
enrolled in a PES and at the same time had the last contact with a PES more that 2 years ago. Results only 
slightly change and are available on request. 
18 This scheme implicitly assumes that, for those who are treated and are able to find a job between t1 and t2, 
the treatment takes place before the outcome.   9
difference in elapsed unemployment duration at t1 is not statistically different from zero 
between treated and untreated, suggesting that elapsed unemployment durations should 
not play a relevant role in the selection into treatment, as also confirmed by the probit 
estimate of the propensity score in section 6.   
A last remark concerns the fact that, unfortunately, we cannot exactly identify the 
program a treated entered in (counselling rather than training or intermediation), since 
this information is not available in the LFS data. We only have information concerning 
the reason of the last contact the individual had with a PES. We will deepen this issue in 
section 6.  
 
5.  Propensity score matching and identification 
In this paper we use propensity score matching, whose basic assumption is selection 
on observables (unconfoundedness): selection into treatment is entirely determined by 
observed variables, and conditional on these variables the assignment into treatment is 
assumed as random. In comparison with OLS, this technique affords better scope in both 
dealing with common support issues and using a non-parametric specification in the 
outcome equation. 
The first step of this technique is to compute the propensity score, i.e. the probability 
of participating in treatment conditional to pre-treatment control variables. Then, by 
comparing treated and untreated with the same propensity score in the common support 
region, it is possible to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Since it 
is often unfeasible to have individuals with exactly the same propensity score, various 
algorithms are usually applied to match treated and untreated. In this paper we use four 
different methods in order to test the robustness of results: nearest neighbour, radius, 
kernel and stratification.19 
As for the treatment variable, it has been defined in the previous section: T is equal to 
1 if between t1 and t2 the individual enrols in a PES and have contacts with PES to look 
for a job, and T=0 if not. In our short (long) term analysis, the outcome variable is 
computed observing the employment status at t2 (t3 and t4).  
If we had data on an experimental design, we would be able to derive the following 
unbiased ATT:  
). | ) ( ( ) | ) ( ( ) | ) ( ) ( ( 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 = − = = = − = Δ T Y E T Y E T Y Y E  
where  Y(1) is the outcome in case of treatment and Y(0) i n  c a s e  o f  n o  t r e a t m e n t .  
Unfortunately, a controlled experimental design is not available. Hence, while the first 
term on the right-hand side is identified in the data, the second term –the outcome of the 
                                                 
19 In this paper we do not go into details of the propensity score matching procedure. See Rosenbaum & 
Rubin (1973), Dehejia. and Wahba (2002), Caliendo and Sabine. (2005). See also Ichino and Becker (2002) for 
an explanation of the software we use.   10
individual in his/her counterfactual treatment situation- is not; this is the usual missing 
data problem in the program evaluation literature. In order to cope with this matter the 
conditional independent assumption (CIA) is used, which states that given a set of 
covariates, X, the counterfactual distribution of the treated is the same as the observed 
distribution of Y(0) for the untreated, i.e. [(Y(0), Y(1))⊥T|X]. 
Using the CIA it is then possible to identify the ‘missing counterfactual’, since:  
], 1 | ) 0 , | ) 0 ( ( [ ] 1 | ) 1 , | ) 0 ( ( [ ) 1 | ) 0 ( ( = = = = = = = T T X Y E E T T X Y E E T Y E X
CIA
X  
where in the last term the observed outcomes of the untreated group (T=0) are averaged 
with respect to the distribution of X in the T=1 group. Hence, the ATTs we were looking 
for become: 
[] [ ] {} 1 |   ) 0 , | ) 0 ( (   ) 1 , | ) 1 ( ( . 1 | ) 0 ( ) 1 ( = = − − = = = − = Δ T T X Y E T X Y E E T Y Y E X  
In other terms, what matching does is to stratify the data into cells defined by each 
value of X. Then, within each cell (i.e. conditional on X) it computes the difference 
between the average outcomes of the treated and the controls, and finally it averages 
these differences with respect to the distribution of X in the population of treated units. 
It is also important to stress that the key choice faced by the unemployed in the period 
(t1, t2) is not simply whether to participate or not, but whether to participate in a program 
in this time interval or not, continuing the search for a job outside the program with the 
knowledge that it will always be possible to participate later on. As in Sianesi (2001a, 
2002a, 2004), in this paper treatment can be understood in the sense of starting a program 
in a given period of time (between t1 and t2) while as control group we consider those 
individuals that were untreated at t1, and that do not get treated in the period (t1 ,t2), no 
matter whether they are to be treated between t2 and t3 or between t2 and t4.20 
In this framework, and using this CIA formulation, we compute both a short and long 
term evaluation. As we will show later on, this distinction is indeed crucial in the 
interpretation of the results.21  
                                                 
20 As Sianesi (2004) claims: “What is required is thus that conditional on having reached the same 
unemployment duration and conditional on all the relevant information observed, the fact that an 
unemployed individual goes into a program in a given month while another waits longer is not correlated 
with the future labour market states the joining individual would have experienced had he instead not 
entered the program at that time.” (p.137). Another way to restate the peculiarity of this CIA assumption is 
that individuals can be assumed as myopic conditional on observables: given X, outcome-related information 
about the future (after t2) plays no role in individual decisions to join a program between t1 and t2 or to wait 
longer. Similar assumptions are made in other papers in the literature, as Lalive, van Ours, Zweimuller (2008) 
and Fredriksson and Johansson (2003). We carry out a robustness check concerning this assumption in section 
7.  
21 Moreover, in this paper we do not have to worry about individuals that do not enter a PES program 
because they already know that they will soon be starting a new job. In particular, the CIA would be violated 
if an individual decided not to enroll because he had received an offer for a job that was to start soon. In the 
Italian LFS data it is possible to identify such individuals, and we drop from the analysis these (very few) 
cases.   11
6.  PES evaluation: estimates and results 
Table 1 shows the propensity score estimates, using a probit.
22 While some variables are 
not significant (gender, potential experience, number of employed and dimension of the 
household, adaptability to fixed term, PES performance index, education lag) for the 
others we derive the expected sign of coefficients. It is also worth pointing out that the 
pseudo  R2 of the probit is quite low, around 0.10. This confirms that our evaluation 
structure reduces the observed heterogeneity between treated and untreated. 
Table 2 shows the ATT coefficients estimated in the common support region.23 As for 
the short term, the first line of table 2 shows that ATTs coefficients are negative and 
significant, meaning that PES enrolment decreases the probability of going through 
transition from unemployment to employment in the short run, no matter which the 
matching procedure used (radius, nearest neighbour, kernel, stratification). 24  
The second line of table 2 shows the corresponding results for the long term 
evaluation, i.e. employment transitions from t1 to t3, between 9 and 12 months as from the 
treatment. ATT coefficients are positive and mostly significant: the ‘PES enrolment’ 
treatment produces an increase in the probability of finding a job by about 8.3 percentage 
points (using the radius method), with respect to the baseline probability of about 29.7% 
(defined as the probability of an untreated to be employed at t3). As robustness check, the 
third line of table 2 refers to the evaluation of the employment transitions from t1 to t4, 
after a period of time between 12 and 15 months from the treatment. Results are 
consistent with those observed at t3: ATT coefficients are positive and slightly lower in 
magnitude. Note also that the balancing properties are always verified, meaning that the 
control variables are not significantly different (at 1%) for individuals having similar 
propensity scores, between treated and untreated (BPNS stands for balancing properties 
not satisfied, i.e. zero means that all the covariates are balanced in all blocks defined in 
the propensity score computation).25  
In order to address for the ATT differences between short and long term, it is plausible 
to argue, as noted in various other papers (Sianesi 2001a, 2001b, 2004), that individuals 
enrolled between t1 and t2 are involved in a lock-in effect in the short run, probably 
                                                 
22 It is also worth noting that control variables to be included in the probit have to affect both outcome and 
treatment equations in order to correct the selection bias into treatment. See for instance Caliendo & 
Kopeining (2005) or Blundell et al. (2005). 
23 The common support region is actually very wide, from 0.04 to 0.44, and it represents only a slightly 
reduced interval with respect to the unrestricted variation of the propensity score (0.03 to 0.45). Accordingly, 
results computed without the common support restrictions are basically the same as the ones computed in 
table 2. 
24 Previous papers concerning PES evaluation in Italy (Barbieri et al. 2002, 2003) investigated only the short 
term outcomes, deriving either not significant or negative ATTs. 
25 It is also worth noting that individuals in the control group might display higher probability of being 
employed at t2, under the hypothesis that skilled individuals find more quickly a job are also less likely to 
enrol in a PES. If this hypothesis held, our estimates should be considered as lower bound. We further 
discuss this issue in sections 8 and 9.    12
because they spend time on activities such us orientation periods, preparing CVs, 
training courses, apprenticeships, etc. In the long run, when these activities are over, the 
treated display higher probabilities of finding jobs. One might argue that the policies 
provided by PES are often characterized by short durations, in this way casting some 
doubts about the lock-in explanation. However, it is important to stress that also the short 
term evaluation takes place after a very short period (from one to 90 days) from the 
treatment. This might suggest that even if the policies provided by PES were of short 
durations, still the lock-in effect might plausibly apply.  
Another important issue concerning policy evaluation in Italy regards the fact that 
there are relevant differences between regions, in particular between the South and the 
Centre-North. Sestito and Pirrone (2006) point out that the number of users of PES in the 
South is much higher than in the North, also because the unemployment rate is higher. 
Moreover, they claim that in the Centre-North the reform process has been introduced in 
a more efficient way. This is confirmed by the ISFOL index, which can be considered as a 
proxy of the quantity and quality of PES activities at the provincial level: provinces 
located in the Centre-North display –in average- higher values of this index. This 
geographical difference might be due either to the fact that the public administration is 
supposed to be better organized in the Centre-North region, or to the fact that since there 
are less unemployed per PES employee in this region, services can be supplied more 
efficiently. Our analysis confirms these conjectures, as shown in table 4. Even if results in 
the two regions are quite similar to the ones at the national level, in the South ATTs are 
more often not significant, and also smaller in magnitude, both in the short and the long 
run. This evidence seems to suggest that PESs are less effective in this region, while in the 
Centre-North estimates are mostly significant and larger in magnitude, entailing greater 
negative (positive) effects in the short (long) run.26 
Recent papers, such as Blundell et al. (2004) and Crepon et al. (2005), have also 
introduced another interesting dimension to the analysis, investigating the efficacy of 
active labour market policies in increasing the probability of finding a good job, 
emphasizing the importance of the quality of a created match. Generally speaking, it 
could be argued that better matches should result in more productive and, then, longer 
lasting jobs (Crepon et al., 2005). Unfortunately, we cannot apply duration analysis since 
we can follow individuals over time only for a fixed period of time (four interviews in 15 
months). Nevertheless, in Italy, as in other countries characterized by segmented labour 
markets, permanent contracts can be considered as a reliable proxy for the willing of the 
employer and the employee to invest in that match over time. On the contrary, bad 
matches are usually associated to temporary contracts, mainly because of the lower social 
                                                 
26 Note that similar regional disparities, i.e. positive ATT in the Centre-North (in Toscany) and not significant 
ATT in the South (Sicily), have been observed by Ichino et al. (2008), in assessing the efficacy of private 
employment services in Italy.   13
security contributions. To address empirically this aspect, we investigate whether a 
treated in a PES displays a higher probability of finding a permanent job.27 We use the 
same evaluation structure and the same treatment variable as in the previous analysis, 
while the outcome variable is equal to one if an individual finds a permanent job, either 
in the short or in the long term, and to zero in all other cases. Table 3 shows the results of 
the analysis. The ATT are still negative (even if lower, i.e. -3.4%), while they become not 
statistically different from zero after 12 months and slightly positive (3-4%) after 15 
months. This means that the PES effects are less pronounced when considering 
permanent contracts as outcome variable, both in the short and in the long term (at 15 
months), suggesting that at least part of the impact of PES observed in table 2 takes place 
through the use of temporary contracts. 
 
As for the interpretation of our results, it is important to recall that the PESs can offer 
to the unemployed different kinds of programmes: counselling, training or 
intermediation, as already stated in section 2. This information in our data is 
unfortunately not available. From a multi-response question in the LFS questionnaire we 
only know the reasons for the last contact with PESs, which are reported in table 5. It 
comes out that 56.9% of the unemployed answers that one of the reasons for the last PES 
contact was to verify the existence of a job opportunity, and 2.6% because of a call related 
to a job offer. On the whole, 59.5% of individuals contacted a PES for its intermediation 
role. On the other hand, only 1.2% of individuals declare that the reason for the last 
contact with PES concerned training programmes and 19.3% regarded activities related to 
counselling. However, the shares related to training and counselling could be 
underestimated if some of the individuals who went to the PES to verify the existence of 
a job opportunity (56.9%) were waiting for outcomes related to previous training or 
counselling activities. Even if we cannot disentangle between these two possibilities 
because this information is not available, we can derive additional information from 
another question in the LFS questionnaire that investigates whether the individual has 
attended a training course, not necessarily through PESs, in the last month: only 2.4% of 
the treated in our sample are involved in training activities (and similarly 2.3% of the 
untreated). This additional evidence from LFS suggests that PES users in Italy are mostly 
recipients of counselling and intermediation activities (and less of training courses).  
Our findings are then consistent with a number of European studies that have recently 
stressed the efficacy of intermediation and counselling programmes – an efficacy that had 
already been underlined by Martin and Grubb (2001). In particular, Blundell et al. (2004) 
                                                 
27 In the Italian legislation it is straightforward to define a permanent job, since it can be univocally associated 
to the so called “Contratto a tempo indeterminato”, i.e. contract without any limit of time. On the contrary, 
we define as temporary jobs all those jobs associated to both fixed term contracts included in the Italian 
legislation (“contratti a tempo determinato”, “contratti di apprendistato”) and to all forms of self-
employment (among which “collaborazione a progetto”, “collaborazioni coordinate e continuative”).    14
provide evidence that in the UK the New Deal for Young People program entails an 
increase in the probability of finding a job of about 5%. Blundell et al. (2004) also claim 
that at least 1% of this positive impact is related to job search assistance, while the 
remaining component is related to job subsidies. Crepon et al. (2005) also show that in 
France the PARE program, which is mainly characterized by intensive job search 
assistance and counselling, increases the proportion of individuals that has found a job 
after one year by less than one percentage point, while it decreases the incidence of 
unemployment recurrence one year after a job is found by 6 percentage points. Weber 
and Hofer (2004) provide evidence also for Austria, showing that job search assistance 
programmes significantly decrease unemployment duration while the effect of training is 
positive.  
To sum up, our results have to be considered as additional evidence in favour of 
intermediation, job search assistance and counselling policies. Moreover, it is worth 
pointing out that these kinds of policies are usually less expensive than wage subsidy 
schemes or training courses, implying that the overall social benefits might be even 
higher. 
 
7.   Robustness checks 
In this section we apply some robustness checks to previous results. The first point to 
make here is that in both the short and long term analyses all the algorithms used to 
match treated and untreated (nearest neighbour, radius, kernel, and stratification) 
provide very similar results. This represents preliminary evidence of the robustness of 
the results.  
Then, we focus on two robustness check exercises, to answer to two different 
questions.28 First, the fact that some unemployed can, at the same time, resort to PESs, 
private employment services, and other training courses might at least partially drive our 
ATT coefficient. To address this point, we consider a slightly different evaluation 
structure, changing the definition of the initial group. So far we have taken into account 
individuals ‘not enrolled’ in a PES at t1. As a check we eliminate from the initial group 
(both treated and untreated) the individuals benefiting in the previous six months (with 
respect to t1) from private employment services or from training courses. The first part of 
table 6 shows that the results do not change much: ATT have the same signs both in the 
short and long run, and are slightly smaller in magnitude. 
Second, one might argue that the positive ATT derived in the long run could be 
partially related to the composition of the control group, which also includes individuals 
treated between t2 and t3. If these individuals were involved in the above mentioned lock-
                                                 
28 We carried out also other robustness checks, which are available on request. For instance, we rule out from 
the analysis the search intensity variable, which is potentially endogenous. Results do not change.    15
in effect in the short term, this might affect our ATT estimates in the long run. In order to 
deal with this problem we exclude from the control group all the individuals treated 
between t2 and t3 that could be potentially affected by the lock-in effect at t3. Similarly, for 
the long run evaluation at t4 we exclude from the control group all the individuals treated 
between t2 and t4. The second part of table 6 shows the ATTs computed using this control 
group: also in this case results do not change much, and are slightly lower in magnitude 
with respect to the baseline setting.29 
 
8.   Sensitivity analysis for possible deviations from the CIA 
One might argue that using propensity score based on selection on observables it is not 
possible to deal with selection on unobservables. To deal with this potential critic, we 
make use of the sensitivity procedure developed by Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008) 
to assess the robustness of our ATT estimates due to possible deviations from the original 
setting of the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), the main untestable 
assumption of matching procedures. 
The central hypothesis of this methodology is that the CIA does not hold in the 
original setting, ) | 1 ( ) ), 1 ( ), 0 ( | 1 ( X T P X Y Y T P = ≠ = , while it is supposed to hold using an 
additional unobservable variable, a binary confounder U, entailing that 
) , | 1 ( ) , ), 1 ( ), 0 ( | 1 ( U X T P U X Y Y T P = = = . Denoting with  ) 0 ( * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( * Y T Y T Y − + =  the 
observed outcome of a given unit, it is possible to fully characterize the distribution of U 
by T and Y, i.e. by four parameters pij defined in the following way: 
}, 1 , 0 { ,                ), , , | 1 ( ) , | 1 ( ∈ = = = = = = = = j i X j Y i T U P j Y i T U P pij  
which gives the probability that U=1 in each of the four groups defined by the binary 
treatment status T and the outcome value Y.30 Once chosen a set of the four pij, U might be 
assigned in different ways to individuals in order to respect these pij constraints.31  
  To deal with this aspect, for a given set of the pij we  carry out replications (200) 
computing different predictions of U to the individuals. For each of this prediction, U is 
introduced in the ATT computation, as any other covariate. Finally, the ATT is computed 
                                                 
29 The exclusion of those treated between t2 and t3 (or between t2 and t4) potentially changes the composition 
of the control group. More specifically, it could be argued that those that get treated in these time spans are 
less skilled than the average individual, in this way reducing the level of skills in the control group. In this 
setting, our estimates might be considered as upper bounds. 
30  Note that, in order to make the simulation of the potential confounder feasible, two simplifying 
assumptions are made: 1) binary U, 2) conditional independence of U with respect to X. Ichino, Mealli and 
Nannicini (2008) present two Monte Carlo exercises showing that these simulation assumptions do not 
critically affect the results of the sensitivity analysis.  
31 In other words, the pij constraints only set the four frequencies of U in the cells defined by the binary values 
of T and Y. These four frequencies can be obtained with a very large set of predictions of U among the N 
individuals divided in the four cells.   16
as average of all replications for a given set of pij, using the preferred matching algorithm 
(radius, nearest neighbour, Kernel).32 
The main question in this procedure is how to choose the pij, in order to simulate a 
‘meaningful’ confounder. As pointed out by Ichino et al. (2008), the real threat to the 
baseline estimate comes from a potential confounder that has both a positive effect on the 
untreated outcome (p01 - p00 > 0) and on the selection into treatment (p1• - p0• > 0).33 The 
presence of such a confounder, even without a true causal relationship between T and Y, 
could completely determine a positive ATT estimate. As a consequence, the sensitivity 
simulations should focus on confounders of this type. Ichino et al. (2008) analytically 
prove that d = p01 - p00 > 0 entails a positive impact on the untreated outcome, i.e. 
) , 0 , 0 | 1 ) 0 ( Pr( ) , 1 , 0 | 1 ) 0 ( Pr( X U T Y X U T Y = = = > = = = , and that  0 0 1 > − = • • p p s  
produces a positive selection effect, i.e.,  ) , 0 | 1 Pr( ) , 1 | 1 Pr( X U T X U T = = > = = .  In 
accordance with this framework, we focus our attention on two parameters d  and  s. 
However, these parameters cannot be considered as the effective impact of U on outcome 
and selection since in order to derive the effective impacts it is necessary to take into 
account the correlation in the data between U and the set of covariates X.34 For this 
reason, estimating a logit model of Pr(Y = 1|T = 0, U,X) in every iteration, and hence 
controlling for the set of covariates X, Ichino et al. (2008) compute the effect of U on the 
relative probability to have a positive outcome in case of no treatment (the observed 
“outcome effect” of the simulated U) as the average estimated odds ratio of the variable 
U:  
,
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while the selection effect, computed in a similar way, is: 
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32 This method shares some intuitions with other sensitivity methods, such us Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) 
and Imbens (2003), with the main differences of not requiring any parametric assumptions for the outcome 
equation, and of focusing on point estimates of ATT. 
33 Note that pi•, i.e., the fraction of individuals with U=1 by treatment status only, is defined as 
) | (   *  
1 , 0
i T J Y P p P
j
j i i = = = ∑
=
• , where P(Y=j|T=i) is the probability observed in the data of a given outcome j 
for a given treatment status i. Hence, by setting p11 and p10 appropriately, the assumption   p1• - p0• > 0 can be 
imposed. 
34 Note the distribution of U given T and Y is not supposed to vary with X, as stressed in the definition of the 
pij. However, there is in the data an empirical association between the simulated U and X, coming indirectly 
from the association of X with T and Y. For more details see Ichino et al. (2008).   17
It is worth noting that when d and s are greater than zero the outcome and selection 
effects must be greater than one, meaning that d and s are positively related to Γ and Λ, 
respectively. 
Ichino et al. (2008) basically propose two exercises to assess the robustness of the ATT 
estimates from possible deviations of the original CIA. First, it is possible to simulate a 
confounder having a distribution similar to other covariates in the data, in order to check 
how the introduction of this confounder would change the ATT (the so-called ‘calibration 
confounder’). Second, the parameters pij might be properly chosen in order to look for the 
so-called ‘killer confounder’, defined as that confounder that -when introduced- would 
drive the ATT to zero. In this setting it is possible to assess whether the parameters that 
drive the ATT to zero are characterized by plausible outcome and selection effects. 
Using the radius matching algorithm, we implement both exercises to assess whether 
the ATT computed in the long run might be partially related to some unobserved U.35 As 
for the simulation of calibrated confounders, we use the distribution of some binary 
covariates that were significant in the propensity score estimate: search intensity, primary 
school, secondary school, adaptability to part time, adaptability to geographical mobility, 
having a family member enrolled in a PES, having been a low-skilled worker in the 
previous job. Table 7 summarises the results, reporting the different values of pij related 
to the chosen binary covariates, the ATT and the standard errors, and the outcome (Γ) 
and selection (Λ) effects as previously defined. It comes out that introducing confounders 
behaving as the chosen binary covariates only slightly alters the ATTs, which are always 
very close to the baseline value as well as standard errors, remaining always significant at 
5%.36 For instance, introducing a confounder distributed as the search intensity covariate 
entails an ATT of 0.84, which is basically the same as the baseline of 0.83, with identical 
standard errors. This represents clear evidence that for various configurations of the 
confounder U the ATTs do not change.  
As for the killer confounder simulation, we let d and s vary from 0.1 to 0.5, in this way 
entailing increasing outcome and selection effects. As in Ichino et al. (2008), we relate the 
killer confounder to unobservable skills, which is in our opinion the main variable we 
cannot fully control for in the original specification.37 We also claim that values of Γ and 
                                                 
35 We report in this paper only the sensitivity analysis of the long term results (after 12 months). The 
sensitivity analyses related to the results of the short term and of the long term evaluation after 15 months are 
very similar from a qualitative point of view from the sensitivity analysis carried out after 12 months and 
confirm the baseline ATTS (available on request). 
36 Note that the standard errors are weighted averages of the within and between standard errors, as in Ichino 
et al. (2008). This choice leads to conservative inferential conclusions, since the average is always greater than 
the within and between components. Nevertheless, the ATT estimates we are interested in always prove to be 
significant. For details see Ichino et al. (2008) and Nannicini (2007). 
37  In order to carry out the killer confounder exercise we have to fix both the incidence of the killer 
confounder in the sample (as in Ichino et al., 2008, we choose P(U=1)=0.4) and the incidence of the 
confounder on the treated outcome (p11-p10=0). Since these parameters are not expected to represent a threat 
for the estimated baseline ATT, they can be held fixed and the simulated confounder U can be fully described   18
Λ greater than 4 have to be considered quite implausible, i.e. the presence of such 
confounder would increase the outcome and/or the selection probabilities by more than 
four times. This is also empirically confirmed by table 7, which shows that the outcome 
and selection effects are always lower than 2 for the chosen calibrated confounders. In 
table 8 we report the ATT computed for all the possible combinations of d and s, both 
ranging from 0.1 to 0.5. Moreover, for each combination of d and s we also display the 
related Γ and Λ. Table 8 shows that for values of d and s lower than 0.3, the outcome and 
selection effects (Γ and Λ) are lower than 4, the chosen threshold, and the associated 
ATTs are positive, significant and very close to the baseline estimate (0.083). This 
confirms the reliability of our ATT estimates due to possible deviations from the original 
setting of the CIA. Another point to bear in mind is that to drive the ATT to zero, the 
selection and the outcome effects have to be simultaneously close to 4 – a situation even 
more improbable.  
 
9.  Unobserved heterogeneity and sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis allowed us to assess the robustness of the CIA using simulated 
confounders as possible deviations from the original CIA setting. Nevertheless, one 
might argue that even if our control variables group is very large, including much 
information at the individual, family and macroeconomic levels, there could be some 
unobserved variables still playing some role. In this last section we make use of the 
sensitivity analysis to understand what direction a possible unobserved heterogeneity 
bias might take and to simulate the related ATT using appropriate confounders. 
The starting point of this section is the perception in the Italian public opinion and the 
previous literature (Barbieri et al. 2002, 2003) that PES clients are negatively selected, in 
the sense that those individuals with relatively worse observed and unobserved 
characteristics are more likely to be enrolled in a PES, while those with better 
characteristics carry out their job search activities not through PES, for instance sending 
curricula directly to employers, using informal networks, etc.  
This means that if treated individuals were actually negatively selected, and if we 
were not able to control thoroughly for this unobserved heterogeneity neither using our 
wide range of covariates nor the sensitivity analysis, our estimates would represent lower 
bounds of the true ATTs, in both the short and the long run. This would entail that in the 
short run the effect might be non negative (either not significant or even positive), while 
in the long run the ATTs might be even greater in magnitude, i.e. more than the 8.3% 
using the radius algorithm.  
                                                                                                                                                   
by d and s. In this setting, the four parameters pij can be univocally determined. For further details see Ichino 
et al. (2008) and Nannicini (2007).   19
A preliminary test of this hypothesis can be achieved by computing the ATT in a ‘thick 
support’, as proposed by Black and Smith (2004). Under plausible assumptions, they 
argue that if unobserved heterogeneity is still playing some role in the selection into 
treatment, this bias is minimized when the analysis is restricted to the centre of the 
distribution of the propensity score, i.e., the thick support region, for instance from the 
20th to the 80th percentiles. The underlying intuition is that if some unobserved selection is 
at work it will more markedly affect the tails of the distribution of the propensity score. 
Applying this procedure to our data for the long term evaluation (at t3), and using radius 
ATT computation as baseline (0.083), we derive a significant ATT of 0.094 in the long run, 
suggesting that probably there is still some unobserved negative self-selection of 
individuals into the treatment.   
We can actually go a bit further in the analysis. Using the ‘killer confounder’ 
procedure we can choose parameters pij in order to derive a confounder U characterized 
by the supposed effects due to unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. a negative selection effect 
and a null or positive outcome effect. Table 9 confirms that when introducing such kinds 
of confounders the ATT increases. More specifically, when s ranges from -0.1 to -0.3, 
entailing a negative selection effect, the ATT remains basically unchanged when no 
outcome effect is at work (d = 0) while when the outcome effect is positive (d > 0) the ATT 
increases. According to this simulation exercise, unobserved heterogeneity plays a role, 
entailing that our estimate might be interpreted as lower bound of the ‘true’ PES effect, in 
both the short and long run.  
Interestingly enough, in this framework it is also possible to compute a sort of upper 
bound of ATT estimates. More specifically, using plausible values of Γ and Λ (no greater 
than 4 and no lower than 1/4, respectively) we observe that the ATTs range between the 
baseline estimate 8.3% and 10.8%, corresponding to values of s and d equal to -0.25 and 
0.3, respectively. This range is also consistent with the ATT estimates computed in a thick 
support, as suggested by Black and Smith (2004). In other words, the simulation exercise 
seems to suggest that if our set of covariates did not fully control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, the ATT estimates would range in the interval [8.3%, 10.8%], thus 




I n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  E u r o p e a n  E m p l o y m e n t  S t r a t e g y ,  m o s t  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
countries have reformed their active labour market policies in the last decade. These 
reforms have hence generated a spread of evaluation exercises for many European 
countries, such as Blundell et al. (2004) for UK, Crepon et al. (2005) for France, Gerfin and 
Lechner (2002) for Switzerland, Sianesi (2004) for Sweden, Weber and Hofer (2004) for 
Austria.  Using propensity score techniques, the aim of this paper is then to fill the gap in   20
the literature concerning the Italian case, assessing the efficacy of Public Employment 
Services (PESs) after the reforms introduced in 1997, 2000 and 2003. 
In line with other papers, such as Sianesi (2004), we show that computing both short 
and long term evaluations really matters in the interpretation of results. In particular, 
while in the short term the PES impact is negative in the long term the PES users display 
a higher probability of finding a job with respect to the untreated. We argue that the 
difference between short and long term results can be accounted for with a lock-in effect. 
In the short run the impact of the treatment might be negative because PES users are 
involved in activities such as preparing CVs, taking part in orientation periods, work-
practice experiences, training courses, etc., in this way temporarily reducing the 
probability of finding a job; however, the probability increases in the long run, when 
these activities are over.  
Our results also show that the PES effects are less pronounced (lower in magnitude 
and not always significant) when considering as outcome a proxy for the quality of the 
job, i.e. having found a permanent contracts, both in the short and in the long term. We 
also point out that geographical differences play a role, since in the Centre-North region 
ATT estimates are greater in magnitude while in the South ATT estimates are not always 
significant. 
Since LFS data provide some evidence that PES users in Italy are mostly recipients of 
counselling and intermediation activities, our results can be considered as in favour of 
these kinds of policies, in line with other European evaluations, such as Blundell et al. 
(2004) for the UK, Crepon et al. (2005) for France and Weber and Hofer (2004) for Austria, 
which claim that job search assistance programmes produce positive effects on 
unemployment related outcomes.  
Finally, the sensitivity analysis proposed by Ichino et al. (2008) confirms our ATT 
estimates, using simulated confounders as possible deviations from the original setting of 
the CIA. Besides, the sensitivity analysis allows us to compute an interval of variation for 
ATT point estimates, and to claim that our ATT estimates should be considered as lower 
bound of the ‘true’ effect of PES in the eventuality of negative unobserved selection into 
treatment.   
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. LFS longitudinal dimension and rotation groups
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Table 1. Probit estimates for the enrolment in a PES
Covariates Coeff p-value
Age 0.036 0.056
Age squared -0.001 0.040
No school - primary - -
Lower secondary 0.193 0.096
Upper secondary (liceo) 0.048 0.786
Upper secondary (no liceo) 0.279 0.025
Humanistic university degree 0.135 0.484
Scientific/giuridic/economic univ. degree 0.124 0.475
No search effort - -
Search intensity 1 (1/2 search actions) 0.146 0.089
Search intensity 2 (3/4 search actions) 0.191 0.052
Search intensity 3 (more than four) 0.401 0.002
Adaptability - part time 0.109 0.127
Adaptability - geogr. mobility 0.143 0.075
Unemployment duration  (in months) 0.158 0.186
Having being dismissed in the previous job 0.141 0.137
With previous job experience - -
Previous experience: low skilled occupation 0.279 0.012
Previous experience: lower blue collar  0.230 0.048
Previous experience: higher blue collar  0.039 0.718
Previous experience: managers & white collar 0.069 0.526
Household members enrolled to PES 0.196 0.000
Turnover rates  (NUTS-III level) -0.016 0.037
Employment variations (NUTS-III level) 0.018 0.050
Agriculture Share  (NUTS-III level) 0.014 0.112
Unemployment rate  (NUTS-III level) 0.014 0.112
Quarter Dummies  yes
Constant -2.324 0.000
Note: All other variables (gender, potential experience, education lag, number of
employed and dimension of the household, adaptability to fixed term, performance of
PES), are not significant, and have been drop from the analysis.      26
Table 2: ATT  of employment probabilites for unemployed not treated at t1
BPNS
coeff t coeff t coeff t coeff t
Short Term (3 months) -0.074 -3.80 -0.072 -2.46 -0.077 -5.41 -0.080 -4.39 0
Long Term (12 months) 0.083 2.97 0.046 1.61 0.077 3.14 0.069 2.63 0
Long Term (15 months) 0.071 2.59 0.029 0.76 0.066 2.40 0.060 2.40 0
348 treated. BPNS stands for balancing properties not satisfied. * is for bootstrapped
standard errors.
Enrolment PES 
(between t1 and t2)
ATT - Propensity score matching
Radius Nearest Kernel* Stratification
 
 
Table 3: ATT of finding a permenent job for unemployed not treated at t1
BPNS
coeff t coeff t coeff t coeff t
Short Term (3 months) -0.034 -3.41 -0.034 -2.16 -0.034 -3.28 -0.035 -3.48 0
Long Term (12 months) 0.027 1.39 -0.009 -0.32 0.025 1.36 0.022 1.54 0
Long Term (15 months) 0.038 1.87 0.017 0.63 0.037 1.89 0.034 1.87 0
348 treated. BPNS stands for balancing properties not satisfied. * is for bootstrapped 
standard errors.
Enrolment PES 
(between t1 and t2)
ATT - Propensity score matching
Radius Nearest Kernel* Stratification
 
 
Table 4: Differences between the Centre-North and the South regions
BPNS
coeff t coeff t coeff t coeff t
Short Term (3 months) -0.121 -3.44 -0.119 -2.18 -0.129 -3.49 -0.135 -3.72 0
Long Term (12 months) 0.111 2.35 0.110 1.69 0.108 2.64 0.101 2.29 0
Short Term (3 months) -0.037 -1.59 -0.090 -2.41 -0.041 -1.82 -0.043 -1.80 0
Long Term (12 months) 0.076 2.25 0.072 1.57 0.067 2.09 0.060 1.38 0
126 treated for the Centre-North, 222 for the South. BPNS stands for balancing properties not 




(between t1 and t2)
ATT - Propensity score matching
Radius Nearest Kernel* Stratification
 
 
Table 5: Reasons of the last contact with the PES* %
To verify the existence of a job opportunity 56.9
Because of a call related to a job-offer 2.6
To carry out vocational training 1.2
For activities related to counselling 19.3
* Multiresponse question. Only items related to job search activities are 
reported, and not the ones related to enrolment.     27
Table 6: Robustness checks
Initial group: unemployed not treated with PES, private empl.services and training at t 1
BPNS
coeff t coeff t coeff t coeff t
Short Term (3 months) -0.069 -3.35 -0.067 -2.11 -0.071 -3.33 -0.073 -3.41 0
Long Term (12 months) 0.068 2.30 0.055 1.50 0.062 2.03 0.057 2.03 0
Long Term (15 months) 0.084 2.82 0.057 1.42 0.078 2.95 0.072 2.42 0
Short Term (3 months) -0.077 -3.89 -0.083 -2.68 -0.082 -4.36 -0.087 -4.10 0
Long Term (12 months) 0.068 2.41 0.109 2.87 0.059 2.07 0.052 1.54 0
Long Term (15 months) 0.066 2.38 0.066 1.74 0.059 2.25 0.053 1.87 0
297 treated for the upper panel, 248 for the bottom panel. BPNS stands for balancing properties
not satisfied. * is for bootstrapped standard errors
Initial group: unemployed not treated with PES at t 1, and removing from the control
group those treated  between t 2 and t 3
Enrolment PES 
(between t1 and t2)
ATT - Propensity score matching





Table 7 : 'Calibrated confounder' sensitivity analysis 
p11 p10 p01 p00 ATT s.e. ΓΛ
Baseline 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.083 0.028 - -
Confounder like:
Search intensity 0.45 0.33 0.41 0.27 0.084 0.028 1.92 1.36
Primary school  0.28 0.45 0.31 0.40 0.082 0.029 0.67 1.10
Secondary school  0.41 0.32 0.36 0.28 0.080 0.028 1.48 1.28
Adapt. part-time 0.41 0.48 0.41 0.39 0.082 0.030 1.13 1.28
Adapt. geogr. mobility 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.083 0.028 1.26 1.35
If family members 
enrolled in PES 0.28 0.34 0.19 0.26 0.082 0.029 0.403 1.23
Previously low skilled  0.15 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.083 0.028 1.135 1.41
The matching algorithm is radius. 200 replications. To make the confounder variables 
binary we used the following classification: search intensity is equal to 1 if the
individual has carried out more than 3 job search actions to look for a job; secondary
school is specific for those who achieved a secondary degree not in a "liceo"; 'if
household members enrolled in a PES' is equal to 1 is at least one person in the
household is enrolled in a PES. Note that p11 refers to the probability that U=1 when
Y and T are equal to 1, and similarly for p10, p01, p00. 
 
   28
Table 8 : 'killer confounder' sensitivity analysis
ΓΛΓΛΓΛΓΛΓ Λ
1.536 1.52 1.545 2.25 1.525 3.564 2.37 5.69 1.56 10.421
2.317 1.47 2.375 2.26 2.396 3.524 2.6 6.02 2.41 10.638
3.54 1.48 3.564 2.23 3.624 3.543 3.69 5.67 3.81 10.307
5.679 1.52 5.665 2.24 5.708 3.479 5.81 5.66 5.91 10.433
9.288 1.45 9.395 2.24 9.434 3.492 9.59 5.73 9.87 10.355






























Table 9 : Unobserved heterogeneity and ATT range of variation
ΓΛΓΛΓΛΓΛ
1.017 0.653 1.018 0.392 1.014 0.292 1.508 0.641
1.508 0.641 1.499 0.393 1.524 0.286 1.531 0.224
2.327 0.644 2.304 0.386 2.266 0.287 2.27 0.197
3.539 0.646 3.488 0.375 3.518 0.277 3.489 0.197
All ATT are significant at 1%.  Radius matching algorithm. 200 replications. 
d=0.3
0.088 0.099 0.12 0.108
ATT ATT ATT
s=- 0.1 s=- 0.2 s=- 0.3 s=- 0.25
ATT
d=0.0
0.084 0.084 0.085 0.083
d=0.1
0.085 0.089 0.096 0.092
d=0.2
0.087 0.093 0.109 0.099
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Untreated Treated
Age 32.93 32.16
Gender (0 Male, 1 Female) 0.54 0.50
Educational levels (in dummies):
No school - primary 0.13 0.10
Lower secondary 0.37 0.39
Upper secondary (liceo) 0.30 0.36
Upper secondary (no liceo) 0.07 0.05
Humanistic university degree 0.05 0.04
Scientific/giuridic/economic univ. degree 0.07 0.07
Education lag 0.91 0.82
Potential Experience 14.85 14.24
Unemployment duration (in months) 27.58 28.19
No search effort 0.26 0.20
Search intensity 1 (1/2 search actions) 0.43 0.42
Search intensity 2 (3/4 search actions) 0.23 0.26
Search intensity 3 (more than four) 0.08 0.12
Adaptability to fixed term contracts  0.87 0.89
Adaptability to part time contracts 0.40 0.45
Adaptability to geographical mobility 0.18 0.23
Having being dismissed in the previous job 0.14 0.19
Fixed term contract in the previous job 0.18 0.22
Previous job experiences 0.61 0.64
Previous experience: low skilled occupation 0.11 0.15
Previous experience: lower blue collar  0.11 0.14
Previous experience: higher blue collar  0.13 0.13
Previous experience: managers and white collar 0.13 0.14
Members of the household 3.61 3.70
Members of the household enrolled in a PES 0.31 0.42
Members of the household employed 0.84 0.82
Unemployment rate 11.30 11.88
Employment variation 0.47 0.92
Turnover rate 13.08 12.88
Agriculture rate 5.62 5.97
APPENDIX
Table A1. Means of the observed characteristics by treatment status 
Variables
Initial group
Classification of categorical variables. Education lag: 1) less than average; 2) in
average; 3) more than average. Potential experience: difference between the
current age and the age when the individual attained the highest educational
level. Job search intensity (number of search actions in the last 4 weeks): 1) 0
search actions; 2) 1-2 search act.; 3) 3-4 search act; 4) more than 4 search actions.
Occupation in the previous job: 1) low skilled; 2) blue collar; 3) high skilled blue
collar; 4) employees, executives: these dummies are identified along with the
dummy for having had job experience since there are few individuals with job
experience but without a specification for the occupation (because the related job
ended more than 7 years ago, information not collected in the LFS). Adaptability
to fixed term or part time contracts, and to geographical mobility are equal to 1 if
an individual declares he/she would accept these conditions in the new job.
 